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Abstract The degree of labor market ﬂexibility is especially important for countries considering
entry into monetary union. The aim of this article is to assess the extent of wage rigidities in Slo-
vakia. The novelty of this paper is in the employment of Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) approach
to the micro data. Firstly, we apply the original methodology on industrial level data drawn from
recent decade. The results obtained from sectoral data are ambiguous for Slovakia. Secondly,
we turn to micro-approach, where we apply slightly modiﬁed methodology on company level
data. The estimated extent of both nominal and real rigidities is relatively small. We conclude
that ﬂexible hourly wages favored the euro adoption in 2009.
Keywords Nominal and real wage rigidity, Slovakia
JEL classiﬁcation E24, J30 ∗ ∗∗
1. Introduction
Wage ﬂexibility is an important concept for monetary policy. It enters into central
banks’ thinking about optimum currency areas as well as into its reasoning about opti-
mum level of inﬂation and consequent setting of inﬂation target.
Knowing the extent of wage ﬂexibility is therefore important in any monetary envi-
ronment; whether exercising own monetary policy or being a part of a larger monetary
union. In case a domestic monetary policy is present, monetary authorities attempt to
set inﬂation targets considering the extent of wage rigidity. If nominal wages are rigid
downwards, it may be desirable to accept some inﬂation to buffer for wage growth es-
pecially when its nominal average is close to zero.1 In case of being a part of a larger
monetary union, other ﬂexible economic policies should be set to compensate for the
extent of wage rigidities. Slovakia adopted the common Euro currency on 1st January
2009. Thus knowing the degree of wage ﬂexibility is in the interest of the National
Bank of Slovakia.2
Following extensive literature, we may distinguish two main measures of wage
ﬂexibility. The ﬁrst is the sensitivity of wages to regional unemployment (so called
∗ National Bank of Slovakia and Comenius University, Imricha Karvaˇ sa 1, Bratislava 813 25, Slovakia.
Phone +421 2 5787 2929, E-mail: pavel.gertler@nbs.sk.
∗∗ National Bank of Slovakia and Comenius University, Imricha Karvaˇ sa 1, Bratislava 813 25, Slovakia.
Phone +421 2 5787 2935, E-mail: matus.senaj@nbs.sk.
1 See Groshen and Schweitzer (1999) who closer elaborate on ,,grease“ and ,,sand“ effect of inﬂation.
2 Artis, Fidrmuc and Scharler (2008) show that rigid labor markets decrease business cycle correlations in
the new member states of the EU.
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“wage curve”) and the other is aversion to wage cuts (so called “downward nomi-
nal/real wage rigidity”). In this paper we will search for an answer to the second of the
two measures on Slovak wage data on the macro level and on the company level.
Wage setting is in its nature a behavioral process occurring at the level of single
economic agents (employees and employers).3 Wage rigidity in the mind of a sin-
gle economic agent is based on loss aversion, which translates into perceived fairness
of wage, which in consequence affects worker’s effort (Fehr and Goette 2000). There-
fore, recent studies on wage rigidities prefer using individual micro data of job-stayers.
Since such individual micro data are not available for Slovakia, our strategy is to start
from distribution based aggregate approach and go further into the structure of wage
changes in single economic units (companies), identify imperfections in measuring
transition economy data with these methods and produce the most plausible estimates.
In contrast to individual microdata, using data on the company level does not allow
us to search where do the rigidities come from. Instead, we will treat rigidities as
exogenous, and rather provide for a prudent answer on what is their extent.
A rich list of literature has been devoted recently to the issue of downward wage
rigidities. However, only three studies so far used Slovak data to estimate some form
of wage rigidity. Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2000) study uses one year (1995) micro
data and ﬁnds an elasticity of wages −0.049.4 Huitfeldt (2001) searches regional data
for effects of unemployment and labor market policies on real wages in Czech Repub-
lic and Slovakia in 1992–1998 and ﬁnds signiﬁcantly less wage rigidity in Slovakia
than the previous study (elasticity under −0.1) as well as compared to Czech republic.
Babeck´ y (2008) studies labour market adjustments and also conﬁrms the elasticity be-
low −0.1 with Phillips curve estimates on 1995–1999 aggregate data. He also adds that
the relationship cannot be found in the data for Slovakia after 2000 as well as for most
of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. These three studies have looked for
some kind of wage ﬂexibility measure through the wage curve and Phillips curve in the
past. However, no study estimating downward wage rigidity in Slovakia has taken into
account wage change distributions. The aim of this paper is therefore, in the ﬁrst place,
to provide the ﬁrst estimates of the extent of downward wage rigidity in Slovakia on
this basis.
In scope of this paper, we understand downward wage rigidity as a share of unre-
alized wage cuts compared to all wage cuts that should occur in a fully ﬂexible envi-
ronment. Since the data used are not of individual nature, we link the concept of wage
cuts to observed negative wage change.
2. Downward wage rigidities: concept and literature overview
At the roots of wage rigidities, literature mostly cites Tobin (1972) for his famous claim
that “inﬂation greases the wheels of labor market”. He claimed that higher inﬂation
provides for a cushion, in which employer may manipulate wages avoiding nominal
3 These conclusions are conﬁrmed e.g. by Fares and Lemieux (2000) and Card and Hyslop (1997).
4 The estimate for Slovakia forms a part of a wage curve estimation for CEE countries in the period of
1990–1997. Elasticity equal to −0.1 means that an employee may expect his real wage to decrease by 1%
in average if unemployment rate in the region of his workplace grows by 10%, ceteris paribus.
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wage cuts. A counterforce called “sand effect”, i.e. distortionary effects of higher in-
ﬂation on price and wage ﬂuctuations and formation of precise expectations, is then
referred to Friedman (1977). A discussion on optimal level of inﬂation, where both
separated effects cancel out (Groshen and Schweitzer 1997) used to be regarded as
central to monetary policy, because optimum level of inﬂation provided effective alle-
viation of wage pressure and thus involving a permanent reduction in unemployment.5
Due to level of inﬂation, wage rigidity has to be considered as a mixed concept of
downward nominal and real rigidities (often abbreviated as DNWR/DRWR in litera-
ture); however, both being neither alternative nor always simply cumulative concepts.
DNWR may become an irrelevant concept in case nominal wage growth is too high
(non-effective) or too low (vanish, real rigidities take over). Therefore, downward real
wage rigidities are usually more relevant in periods with higher inﬂation, when nomi-
nal growth illusion is being distorted.6 On the other hand, institutional settings of labor
market, especially those indexed by inﬂation are likely to make real wages more rigid.7
Within this paper, we understand downward wage rigidity as a certain number of
wage freezes or moderate wage increases that would realize as negative wage changes
if wages were fully ﬂexible (Figure 1). The rationale is that any negative wage change
causes loss of employee motivation, therefore some moderate wage changes are too
costly for an employer to realize. In such case, it is cheaper for employer to freeze
wage or to slightly raise it. Wages consist of total remuneration received by employees
including payments for time not worked (such as for annual vacations) and bonuses.
The most common approach used to identify and measure downward wage rigidi-
ties in literature in recent decade is the histogram location approach. The problem to be
coped with is to compare actual wage change distribution with a notional distribution,
which reﬂects the no-rigidity hypothesis. It is therefore central to deﬁne, how notional
distribution shall be constructed.
In the method proposed by Kahn (1997), the shape of a distribution of no rigidity
hypothesis is assumed to be constant in time. This means that a proportion of ob-
servations accumulated in a histogram bar given distance from median should remain
constant over time. A presence of DNWR in Kahn’s paper is then represented by the
extent of misalignment in a relative number of observations in neighboring histogram
bars reﬂecting the position of median. Another method proposed by Lebow et al.
(1995) assumes symmetry of a notional wage change distribution. This method com-
prises simple tail analysis (so called LSW test) of any actual wage change distribution.
5 While discussing optimum level of inﬂation, ﬁndings of Elsby (2006) need to be considered, too. He
argues and shows evidence on US and UK micro data that in case of presence of DNWR, besides avoiding
wage cuts employers tend to compress also large wage increases in case inﬂation is high to buffer for future.
He therefore concludes that accounting for such weakening of the “grease” effect, optimum level of inﬂation
is to be somewhat lower than previously expected.
6 Nickell and Quintini (2001) use U.K. NES (New Earnings Survey) data to provide for evidence that spikes
at zero nominal wage change are more marked when inﬂation is low. Besides, they show evidence that since
nominal rigidities are focused on zero nominal wage changes, it induces the more distortion in real wage
changes the higher is inﬂation rate (the closer to average nominal wage growth).
7 Bauer, Bonin and Sunde (2004) conclude that most of the wage rigidity in Germany with central wage
bargaining can be attributed to real wage rigidity, which seems to increase with inﬂation and centralized
bargaining outcomes.























(a) Fully ﬂexible wages (b) Wage rigidities
Figure 1. Hypothetical shape of distribution without/with wage rigidities
Both these assumptions are rather restrictive, though many other factors causing
asymmetries and/or non-constant shape of distributions have been found later. For
instance Nickell and Quintini (2003) argue that lower inﬂation supports asymmetry
of distribution. They use U.K. Earnings Survey to show that size of spike and step
at zero wage growth depends negatively on the rate of inﬂation (and other statistical
parameters of a distribution, too). Lebow et al. (2003) concentrate on other than wage
measures that employer may use to compensate for negative wage changes, as e.g.
cutting social beneﬁts. Consequently they conclude that rigidities may not be seen
properly in data. Christoﬁdes and Leung (2003) consider the effect of unions’ will to
temporarily trade off employment for wage adjustments especially as far as temporary
contracts are concerned. Some consented wage freezes may thus inﬁltrate in data and
distort results. Elsby (2006) brings an evidence of leveling off wage changes in time by
employers. He argues that especially in case of volatile annual inﬂation rate and rigid
wages, employers tend to restrict wage growth in good times in order to buffer for “low
inﬂation–low wage growth” periods in future. All these effects may have signiﬁcant
effect on symmetry and/or shape of distribution.
Dickens et al. (2007) also begins from a simple symmetry assumption, adjusting
however for various possible asymmetries derived from both country data and common
cross-country observations in wage distributions. This way they produce one of the
most complex and extensive paper so far in this area.
Besides adjustments of Kahn’s or Lebow’s method, some studies use hybrid me-
thods. One of them, by Nickell and Quintini (2003) uses non-parametric estimation of
wage change statistical parameters to depict nonlinearities and links wage change dis-
tribution to estimated relationships. As the estimation needs to be undertaken on time
series, one needs longer time span of data. Yamaguchi (2005) avoids this necessity on
Polish data with using more information from wage growth distributions by Kahn-like
bar method.
Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) also realize restrictiveness of both assumptions and
propose to construct hypothetical distribution from those actual ones, which they iden-
tify as no-rigidity state. By constructing individual notional distributions from hypo-
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thetical distribution adjusting for speciﬁc median and variance they conceptually avoid
the two restrictive assumptions, too.
Further theoretical and empirical literature reviews on nominal wage rigidity are
condensed in e.g. Camba-Mendez (2003). Results of empirical ﬁndings are generally
in line to conclude with ﬁnding an evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity in
Europe (Dessy 2005; Dickens et al. 2007; Knoppik and Beissinger 2005), its signi-
ﬁcant cross-country variations (Dickens 2007) and more nominal rigidity in the U.S.
compared to Europe (Knoppik and Beissinger 2005).
3. Methodological issues
In this part we brieﬂy introduce the methodology which helps us to identify measure
and test the extent of prevented wage changes. Detailed description can be found in
Holden and Wulfsberg (2007).
3.1 Construction of the notional distribution and measurement of the downward
wage rigidity
The main assumption of this approach is that absence of rigidity is present in some
country years8 in the sample. Thus the ﬁrst task is to choose those country years
which represents the environment where wage rigidity does not bind. We decided to
pick those with the highest nominal and real median wage growth within the sample.
Selected wage change distributions are normalized by subtracting the corresponding
medians and dividing by standard deviations (1). The resulting wage change distri-








where j stands for industry or ﬁrm, i is a symbol of the country and t denotes year.
The hypothetical distribution is used to construct the notional distribution for each
country year which represents the hypothesis of no rigidity. Therefore we multiply the
common hypothetical distribution by corresponding standard error and then we add
the country year median (2). The notional wage changes distribution is constructed as
follows:
Dwnot
it = Dwhyp·sit +medit (2)
The notional incidence rate is a share of the number of industries/ﬁrms that are
supposed to decrease wages (according to notional assumption of no rigidity) to the








The empirical incidence rate is computed similarly:
8 We use the term country year. However, in Section 6 it stands for one year as we focus only on Slovakia.














The extent of rigidity is measured by a comparison of the amount of negative em-
pirical and notional wage changes, represented by the incidence rates. Thus we are









to total, which do not report negative wage changes despite they would do so if wages
were assumed not rigid.
In order to apply the approach proposed by Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) to com-
pany level data, we slightly modify their method of choosing the hypothetical (under-
lying) distribution. We also assume no rigidity in the hypothetical distribution, but here
we are constrained by shorter time period. The analyzed data sample consists of seven
years, thus we pick only one year (instead of bulk of country years) out of our sample
with highest median of nominal and real hourly wage growth.9
3.2 Testing for signiﬁcance
In order to test the signiﬁcance of computed shares of industries/ﬁrms affected by wage
rigidity we conduct the following test/procedure. We depart from the null hypothesis
that wage rigidity are statistically insigniﬁcant (no rigidity in wages).
A simpliﬁed version of binomial test is used. Instead of computing the exact prob-
abilities we rather simulate draws from binomial distribution 5,000 times. This much
decreased the computational requirements. Certain part of the results was double-
checked and normal approximation was used for the Binomial distribution. Both tests
gave us the same results.
The ﬁrst step is to draw from the standard binomial distribution B(n,p) n times,
where n stands for number of trials and p for a success probability. Particularly, in this
context, n is a number of empirical observations belonging to the respective country
year and p is the notional incidence rate (qnot
it ). We proceed by repeating this step 5000









Dividing Sit by n we obtain simulated incidence rate (qsim
it ) and respectively fraction
of wage changes prevented (fwcpsim
it ).10 We then count the number of simulated ne-
gative wage changes Sit, which are higher than the number of observed negative wage
9 According to our data, there is no doubt for choosing the year 2002. Nevertheless, there is still possibility,
that wage rigidity was present also in 2002 data. If this is the case, the presented ﬁgures stand for the lower
bound of the actual extent of rigidity.
10 fwcpsim
it is very similar to fwcpnot
it by construction. The higher is the number of simulations, the more
these two values converge.
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changes in the corresponding empirical distribution (labeled Hit). Finally, the p-value
is obtained as 1−Hit/5000. If p-value is smaller than chosen signiﬁcance level, the
null hypothesis of no rigidity should be rejected.
4. Data
The following part describes datasets that we have used. Firstly, we present industry
level data employed in cross-country analysis. Secondly, detailed individual company
level micro data from Slovakia is depicted.
4.1 Industry level data
We use cross-country wage data in sectors of old EU member states extended by 8
new EU member states. The aim of this is to bring in the cross-country factor into
the analysis, which allows for comparison of rigidities in wage formation internation-
ally. To do this, we use an unbalanced panel of wage growth data in manufacturing
from ILO database. Overall, we have collected 3925 annual wage change observations










Observations 3925 1616 2309 1817 962 612 236 2006
Country-years 189 78 111 85 43 31 11 95
Inﬂation (%) 4.0 5.7 2.8 6.4 6.9 5.7 6.8 2.0
Nominal wage changes
Nominal wage cuts 235 95 140 93 23 67 2 142
Country-years with no
89 40 49 49 29 12 9 31 nominal wage cuts
S.D. 0.073 0.090 0.054 0.088 0.076 0.116 0.061 0.036
Median 0.048 0.065 0.042 0.088 0.088 0.090 0.091 0.032
Incidence rate (%) 6.0 5.9 6.1 5.1 2.4 10.9 0.8 7.1
Share of country-years
47.1 51.3 44.1 57.6 67.4 38.7 81.8 32.6 with no cuts (%)
Real wage changes
Real wage cuts 926 382 544 423 229 159 70 501
Country-years with
21 9 12 7 3 4 0 7 no real wage cuts
S.D. 0.061 0.074 0.049 0.079 0.061 0.111 0.062 0.036
Median 0.019 0.021 0.018 0.030 0.028 0.044 0.024 0.014
Incidence rate (%) 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.3 23.8 26.0 29.7 25.0
Share of country-years
11.1 11.5 10.8 8.2 7.0 12.9 0 7.4 with no cuts (%)
Source: authors’ calculation.
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from 20 countries (EU-25 excluding Malta, Cyprus, Luxemburg, Portugal, Greece and
Italy; including Norway), forming 189 country-years in up to 11 year-on-year changes
(starting 1996/1995 ending 2006/2005).
In our sample, maximum number of industries per country-year is 23, minimum
is 12. Overall, we observe 235 nominal negative wage changes, i.e. incidence rate of
6% of all observations. These negative wage changes are distributed unevenly, all of
them within 100 country-years; other 89 country-years do not include a single industry,
with year-on-year wage decline in nominal terms. Further statistics of the sample is
presented in Table 1.
4.2 Company level data
To our knowledge, company level microdata have been used in histogram location
approach in two studies so far. In Lebow et al. (2003) wages are deﬁned as hourly
costs of wages and beneﬁts in an establishment. Their data source is the Bureau of
LaborStatistics’employmentcostindex. Likewise, Brzoza-Brzezina andSocha(2007)
employed enterprise level data from a survey of medium sized and large enterprises in
Poland. Besides other ﬁndings, both of these papers provide evidence that the wage
costs are less affected by the downward nominal wage rigidity than basic wages alone.
Since we are using similar wage deﬁnition, we shall account for larger ﬂexibility from
margins of adjustment in ﬂexible components of wage.
Since we cannot track individual wages over time in Slovak data we ﬁnd business
surveys conducted annually by the Statistical Ofﬁce of the SR as the most appropriate
data sources for this type of analysis in Slovak environment. Particularly, three sur-
veys11 were merged in order to obtain as representative sample as possible. Although
small businesses (up to 19 employees) are not fully represented in the database, (this is
one of the drawbacks of our data source) medium (from 20 to 99 employees) and large
companies (with more than 100 employees) are surveyed exhaustively. The database
used covers about half of the employees in the production sector of the economy. Ta-
ble 2 compares data for the economy as a whole and the sample used.
Table 2. Comparison of the data sample and the Slovak economy
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Data sample
Enterprises 4,812 4,904 5,138 4,932 5,039 5,494 5,498
Employees 774,872 735,650 790,487 749,790 732,986 849,470 834,749
Slovak production sector
Employees 1,607,552 1,608,622 1,616,513 1,621,704 1,668,034 1,712,702 1,766,541
Source: Statistical Ofﬁce of the SR (SO SR), authors’ calculation.
We consider both full time and part time employees. The main variable we use is
11 E.g. annual questionnaire on business statistics (ROC 1-01), Annual questionnaire in banking and non-
banking ﬁnancial institutions (PEN P 5-01), Annual questionnaire in insurance (POI P 5-01).
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the change of average hourly wage (in both nominal and real terms) in the company.12
Further, we ﬁlter the database to eliminate an impact of assumed error inputs, which
originate mainly from incorrectly ﬁlled in questionnaires.13
The dataset covers the period from 2000 to 2007. Due to the methodological
changes in the surveys, the years before 2000 are not considered. Selected time pe-
riod includes years with lower (2.8%) as well as higher (8.5%) level of inﬂation. The
difference between highest and lowest inﬂation rate is almost 5.7% what guarantees
that the distributions of changes in wages are different across the sample.14 The basic
statistical properties of the analyzed data sample are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Statistical properties of wage changes and basic macro indicators
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Changes in nominal total compensation
Median 0.066 0.101 0.063 0.054 0.063 0.078 0.084
Mean 0.066 0.101 0.060 0.062 0.063 0.078 0.084
S.D. 0.139 0.138 0.134 0.137 0.132 0.135 0.136
Changes in real total compensation
Median −0.007 0.068 −0.022 −0.021 0.036 0.033 0.056
Mean −0.007 0.068 −0.025 −0.013 0.036 0.033 0.056
Macro indicators
Unemployment rate (%) 19.2 18.5 17.4 18.1 16.2 13.3 11.0
Employment growth (%) 1.0 0.2 1.8 0.3 2.1 3.8 2.4
Average wage growth (%) 8.2 9.3 6.3 10.2 9.2 8.0 7.2
Inﬂation rate (%) 7.3 3.3 8.5 7.5 2.7 4.5 2.8
Source: SO SR, authors’ calculation.
An interesting difference between industry and company level data can be seen
from Figure 2, which shows the distributions of the annual wage changes. Although
Slovak industry level data (used in the previous part) displays hardly any wage changes
during the whole sample, almost 30% of observed companies change their hourly
wages.15 Moreover, average wage growth was from 6% to 10% during the years
2000 and 2007 in Slovakia. This paradox may be explained by at least the following
three reasons. Firstly, changes in the composition of workforce may have changed the
average wage costs even if the wage rates stayed on the same level. Secondly, changes
in the number of hours worked may have modiﬁed the average hourly wage even if
12 Dwaget/t−1 = waget/waget−1 −1. The total amount of wage costs were divided by the total amount of
hours worked. Although, both numbers are reported by companies, such deﬁnition may lead to measurement
errors.
13 Annual wage change of more than 50% is considered as incorrect input in any of the two years and such
observation is therefore eliminated. Observations with missing values were eliminated, too.
14 Kramarz (2001) claims that wage change distributions in years of high inﬂation strongly differ from those
observed in years of low inﬂation.
15 Blinder and Choi (1990) discovered that the money wage cuts were more common in the US than they
had imagined even they analyzed a time period characterized by low unemployment.
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Source: authors’ calculation.
Figure 2. Distribution of hourly wage changes: kernel vs. normal density functions
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hourly wage remained the same. And ﬁnally, cutting bonuses in aiming to decrease to-
tal costs of the company could also lower wage costs. It has been shown by Babecky et
al. (2008), that changes in bonuses, non-pay beneﬁts and slowing down promotions be-
longs to potential margins used by companies to reduce labor costs. They also present
survey results on the particular case of the Czech Republic that 31% of companies pre-
fer to reduce bonuses, 9% prefer cheaper hires, 9% choose early retirements and 50%
of the companies use other labor cost reduction strategy.
5. Results: industry level data
5.1 Examining effects of full sample heterogeneity
The fact that our data come from both developed and transition economies results in
signiﬁcantly different statistics for these two groups.16
Full sample of raw wage changes is more positively skewed with lower kurto-
sis. This is because of higher nominal wage growth in transition countries mainly due
to economic convergence.17 Different statistics of the two subsamples of raw wage
changes suggest that we should examine, whether some effect of this disparity is trans-
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(a) Full sample (b) EU-15 and Norway
Figure 3. Histogram of nominal wage changes
To illustrate features of the two subsamples, we calculated the sensitivity of inci-
dence rate to median wage growth. In full sample, one percentage point shift in median
real wage growth to the left translates into 4.3 to 6.3 percentage points more real nega-
tive wage changes (causing higher incidence rate of wage changes).18 The same size
16 FurtherinthetexttobereferredtoasEU-15fordevelopedeconomiesandEU-10fortransitioneconomies.
17 Skewness of the full sample is 1.19 compared to 0.26 of EU-15 countries; kurtosis of the full sample is
15.6, compared to 28.1 of EU-15. Mean nominal wages of EU-15 is 3 percentage points lower than of the
full sample, resp. 1.5 percentage points in terms of median nominal wages.
18 Underlying relationship is non-linear. Inspired by Nickell and Quintini (2001) we regress incidence rate
of negative wage changes on respective median wage change and its square and standard deviation.
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shift in nominal terms translates into 0.9 to 2.1 percentage points more nominal nega-
tive wage changes. These ﬁndings conﬁrm higher sensitivity of incidence rate in real
terms due to smaller distance of wage changes from the level of inﬂation than is their
distance from nominal zero growth (see Figure 3). Looking at separate subsamples
however, we produce very different results. Sensitivity of incidence rate to nominal
wage growth for EU-15 countries increase to 2.0–5.5 percentage points and to real
wage growth to 11.9–27.7 percentage points. Coefﬁcients for old EU member states
are in line with the full sample both in nominal and real terms.
Observing these data after normalization (see Figure 4), the geographic subsamples
do resemble to a larger extent. Distribution of full sample of countries easily passes
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(a) Full sample (b) EU-15 and Norway
Figure 4. Histogram of normalised nominal wage changes
Perhapsmoresensitiveissueisaselectionprocedure, whichidentiﬁessuchcountry-
years that shall be assumed to represent non-rigidity environment. Holden and Wulfs-
berg (2007) suggest populating hypothetical distribution with those empirical distri-
butions, where median wage growths (both nominal and real) qualify in their respec-
tive upper quartiles. Criteria to qualify however are represented by statistics of raw
wage changes (not-normalized). Therefore, criteria will favor new EU member states
country-years, whichdopossesshighermedianvalues. Resultingdistributionsof“non-
rigidityassumed” normalized wage changes of fullsamplecompared tothoseofEU-15
subgroup already yields some visible differences (see Figure 5).
While controlling for medians, mean is located more to the left in EU-15 subgroup,
moreover distribution is less positively skewed. Nevertheless, testing for equality (by
two-sample KS test) does not rule out that the two distributions are alike.
The two steps (constructing hypothetical and deriving notional distribution) are
linked and this link should be reviewed. Selection of partial distributions in the con-
struction phase is made by draws from the right tail of median wage change distri-
bution. As symmetry of the two geographical subsets differ, the selection from full
19 Tested with two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality.
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(a) Full sample (b) EU-15 and Norway
Figure 5. Histogram of nominal wage change observations qualifying in the upper quartile se-
lection
sample behaves as an outlier set within the old EU member states subgroup. Even
though normalization through median and variance absorbs much of misalignments,
notional incidence rates of old EU member states subgroup are for this reason subject
to downward shift by 1 to 2.5 percentage points (difference of notional incidence rates
in Table 2 and Table 3). We may therefore conclude that resulting fwcp of old EU
member states subgroup are pressed down (by 25% in average in proposed composi-
tion) if they are calculated in full sample with new EU member states data.
We have not found any feasible alternative proxy for construction of non-rigidity
hypothesis. Manipulating qualiﬁcation criteria (e.g. narrowing the criteria to deciles)
does not make results any better. Hypothetical distribution thus remains with fewer
selected observations of the more distant outlying data. The above described effect is
thenevenstronger. Besides, hypotheticaldistributionwithfewerobservationsproduces
larger risk of non-normality, further hurting reliability of notional incidence rates and
consequent fwcp. For further calculation we will therefore stick to the selection of at
least top quartile observations.
5.2 Results and their robustness
When the full sample is used, only new EU member states country-year data clas-
sify into the hypothetical distribution. Greater variance and median changes of these
country-years then reﬂect into the hypothetical distribution, giving imperfect informa-
tion to notional distributions of old EU member states. Further to this, low empirical
incidence rates mainly in new EU member states also somewhat complicate the output
of calculated fwcp.
Overall results suggest that 12% of annual averaged nominal wage declines in
sectors do not realize due to downwards wage rigidities. Signiﬁcance of this result
is conﬁrmed by the p-value. Individual countries results are however largely insigniﬁ-
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cant except for few. Moreover, signiﬁcant results for Slovakia (and to certain extent for
Austria) are undermined by low empirical incidence rate. Arguments depicting imper-
fections of calculations in full sample made in Section 5.1 also have to be taken into
consideration.
Table 4. Downward wage rigidity of full sample
Countries Years Obs. qemp qnot qsim fwcpsim P-value
Austria 7 161 0.0186 0.0601 0.0601 0.6897 0.0106
Belgium 5 114 0.1316 0.1953 0.1955 0.3269 0.0514
Denmark 10 230 0.1043 0.1078 0.1077 0.0309 0.4908
France 9 207 0.0193 0.0325 0.0325 0.4056 0.1960
Ireland 10 120 0.0167 0.0155 0.0157 −0.0632 0.7130
Hungary 11 253 0.0237 0.0164 0.0165 −0.4412 0.8772
Finland 10 228 0.1228 0.1320 0.1324 0.0725 0.3760
Estonia 10 172 0.0407 0.0357 0.0351 −0.1586 0.7432
Latvia 11 232 0.1336 0.1667 0.1660 0.1949 0.0792
Lithuania 10 208 0.1394 0.1486 0.1495 0.0674 0.3836
Netherlands 10 190 0.0421 0.0552 0.0553 0.2389 0.2644
Norway 9 102 0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 1.0000 0.9354
Poland 11 253 0.0435 0.0449 0.0453 0.0401 0.5204
Slovakia 11 236 0.0085 0.0442 0.0423 0.7995 0.0022
Slovenia 11 243 0.0123 0.0072 0.0072 −0.7233 0.9022
Spain 7 161 0.1056 0.0731 0.0733 −0.4399 0.9582
U.K. 9 207 0.0918 0.1049 0.1045 0.1215 0.3158
Sweden 8 159 0.0377 0.0429 0.0433 0.1284 0.4644
Germany 10 229 0.0699 0.0674 0.0668 −0.0462 0.6478
Czech Rep. 10 220 0.0182 0.0167 0.0165 −0.1014 0.7032
Total 189 3925 0.0599 0.0654 0.0684 0.1242 0.0124
Source: authors’ calculation.
Calculating the same for old EU member states sample separately goes around
these imperfections and yields already interpretable results of wage rigidities. The re-
sults suggest that high nominal wage rigidity is present in Belgium and Netherlands
(over 40%), somewhat elevated nominal wage rigidity in U.K. (28%) and Finland
(21%), while signiﬁcant rigidities has been conﬁrmed for several other countries as
Austria and France, but these results are partially undermined by low empirical inci-
dence rate (below 0.02).20
Comparing notional incidence rates and fractions of wage changes prevented for
relevant countries between the Table 5 and the Table 4 we may observe differences,
which occur when distributions with higher wage changes enter into the sample.
20 As described earlier, higher median wage change yields incident rate closer to zero. Low empirical
incidence rate in turn means higher probability of misalignment between continuous nature of notional and
discrete nature of empirical incidence rate (e.g. 0.02 levelling roughly to overall 3 negative observations per
country). Results in such cases (Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Ireland, Norway) must be then interpreted with
special care.
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Table 5. Downward wage rigidity: old EU-15
Countries Years Obs. qemp qnot qsim fwcpsim P-value
Austria 7 161 0.0186 0.0763 0.0766 0.7567 0.0006
Belgium 5 114 0.1316 0.2200 0.2213 0.4053 0.0104
Denmark 10 230 0.1043 0.1294 0.1294 0.1937 0.1400
France 9 207 0.0193 0.0434 0.0434 0.5547 0.0548
Ireland 10 120 0.0167 0.0222 0.0219 0.2386 0.5140
Finland 10 228 0.1228 0.1550 0.1556 0.2110 0.0964
Netherlands 10 190 0.0421 0.0750 0.0749 0.4375 0.0448
Norway 9 102 0.0000 0.0017 0.0017 1.0000 0.8378
Spain 7 161 0.1056 0.0960 0.0963 -0.0970 0.7102
U.K. 9 207 0.0918 0.1281 0.1276 0.2805 0.0682
Sweden 8 159 0.0377 0.0570 0.0578 0.3474 0.1772
Germany 10 229 0.0699 0.0841 0.0833 0.1609 0.2614
Total 104 2108 0.0674 0.0863 0.0944 0.2863 0.0000
Source: authors’ calculation.
In standard situation fwcp closer to one means more downward wage rigidity,
fwcp closer to zero means more downward wage ﬂexibility. Negative fwcp values
are present in situations, where calculated notional incidence rate of wage changes is
lower than measured empirical incidence rate of wage changes. Such situation may
therefore also be considered as wage ﬂexibility. All these ﬁndings apply only in case
the two incidence rates are signiﬁcantly distant (p-value) and hence disturbances are
eliminated.
As it emerges from (5), fwcp should be negatively sloped relative to empirical
incidence rate. This is true in EU-15 sample, however not so in the full sample.
Points in the left part of Figure 6 do not visually follow the logic of the relationship
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Figure 6. Empirical incidence rate and simulated fraction of wage changes prevented
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EU-10. This conﬁrms the above conclusion that essential relationship for this analysis
does not hold for common sample.
Thus we may conclude that if downward wage rigidity for developed and transition
economies is calculated in common sample, we face two possible sources of distortion.
First, coming from construction of non-rigidity hypothesis of two distinct sets of data;
second coming from too few observations of negative wage growth, having its origin
partly in higher median wage changes.21
The results of EU-15 ﬁndings are generally in line with the results of Holden and
Wulfsberg (2007) full sample across all periods (1973–1999), whose downward nomi-
nal wag rigidity estimate of the developed economies sample reaches 26%.22
Our results for downward nominal wage rigidities for separate EU-15 sample may
beconfrontedwithpastevidenceofidenticalapproachofHoldenandWulfsberg(2007)
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Figure 7. Country results of fwcp compared to results of Holden and Wulfsberg (2007) and
Dickens et al. (2007)
As for entire sub-samples we may conﬁrm less downward wage rigidity in EU-10
countries than in EU-15, while most of the signiﬁcant fwcp values are closer to zero.
However, for most of the EU-10 countries in the sample we could not measure any
wage rigidities (being insigniﬁcant). We also cannot draw any conclusion for Slovakia.
This is because of the second listed source of distortion above, i.e. too few negative
observations.
The ability to compare downward wage rigidities between old and new EU member
states was the supporting idea for choosing the histogram location approach. However,
now we see that due to structural differences in our data, any effort to estimate the full
sample together leads us to incomplete information.
21 Besides Slovakia and Slovenia, Ireland and Norway may be considered so due to its excess growth relative
to EU average in the time observed.
22 They include some extra OECD countries, but exclude new EU member states.
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5.3 Reasons for turning to microdata
Some drawbacks are present if applying histogram location approach of Holden and
Wulfsberg (2009) on full sample of EU member states aggregate wage growth data.
Since selection criteria are nominal, high inﬂation country data are favored to qua-
lify. These are predominantly new member states. Higher inﬂation is however a side-
effect of their economic boom, providing extra points for less negative wage changes to
be reported. This additional downward push effect on incidence rates shifts calculated
wage rigidities upwards.
Lacking observations in partial distributions (from 12 to 23 industries) makes more
likely empirical negative wage changes to be zero. If empirical incidence rate is too
close to zero, difference between observing no and one negative wage change per
country-year makes too large an impact on overall result.
Interpreting resulting fwcp in this setting is not straightforward. Ideally, we would
like to say that some share of wages was prevented from dropping over the year. Since
single observation represents an industry/sector, we may only say that certain percent-
age of average sectoral wage changes over the year was prevented.
On top of the above we lose much of valuable information from within the sectors
and observe extremely low incidence rates of wage changes in Slovakia. We therefore
turn our attention to company level microdata, because individual chained wage data
are not available for Slovakia (neither in most of the transition countries). Results of
aggregate data will serve as a reference and a useful starting point to compare all the
next results with.
6. Results: company level data
Departing from the ﬁndings above, we put the emphasis on the analysis of the company
level microdata.
6.1 Results for Slovakia
Table 6 presents the outcomes of analysis of nominal rigidity in hourly wages. In the
early years of the sample we did not ﬁnd a presence of rigidity. Notional incidence rate
(qnot) signiﬁcantly exceeds empirical incidence rate only after 2005. Consequently,
the fraction of wage changes prevented rises from about 5% in 2005 to almost 10% in
2007. The estimated fwcp are statistically signiﬁcant. Thus we can conclude that at
least 5% out of those companies, which would change wages in the absence of rigidity,
are affected by downward nominal wage rigidity (in 2005).23 Another important ﬁnd-
ing is that the degree of rigidity tends to slightly increase in recent years. For the sake
of simplicity we calculated shares of the companies affected by nominal rigidity and
they are reported in column labeled as nominal wage rigidity (nwr). nwr ranges from
23 Since the obtained results could be affected by adjustments in the company structure (such as by substi-
tuting expensive employees by cheaper ones), Brzoza-Brzezina and Socha (2007) suggest to treat the results
as the lower bound of the true DNWR at enterprise level.
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1.5% to 2.2%, which means that at least 1.5% of companies were affected by wage
rigidity in 2005.24
Table 6. Nominal wage rigidity in Slovakia
Years Obs. qemp qnot qsim fwcpsim nwr P-value
2001/2000 4812 0.257 0.266 0.266 0.033 0.009 0.085
2002/2001 4904 0.185
2003/2002 5138 0.268 0.268 0.268 0.000 0.000 0.504
2004/2003 4932 0.288 0.299 0.299 0.036 0.011 0.051
2005/2004 5039 0.248 0.263 0.263 0.058 0.015 0.006∗∗
2006/2005 5494 0.207 0.229 0.229 0.094 0.022 0.000∗∗
2007/2006 5498 0.194 0.214 0.214 0.096 0.021 0.000∗∗
Note: ∗∗ DNWR are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Source: authors’ calculation.
Our results are in line with those reported for Poland. Brzoza-Brzezina and Socha
(2007) concluded that the extent of rigidity at the enterprise level was relatively small
during the period 1996–2005.
An interesting question arises about the impact of detected rigidity in hourly wages
on the labor market, particularly on wage growth (and consequently on inﬂation). The
estimated impact of downward nominal wage rigidity on wage growth is relatively
low and can be considered negligible. For instance, in 2006 (fwcp equals to 9.4%)
downward nominal wage rigidity caused additional costs to employers in amount of
296 million SK (9.8 mil. EUR). If we translate this to annual wage dynamics, this
amounts to 0.14 percentage points of the wage growth if compared to fully ﬂexible
environment.
Applying the same methodology on inﬂation adjusted data; the extent of the down-
ward real wage rigidity can be analyzed.
Table 7. Real wage rigidity in Slovakia
Years Obs. qemp qnot qsim fwcpsim rwr P-value
2001/2000 4812 0.530 0.525 0.525 −0.008 0.732
2002/2001 4904 0.259
2003/2002 5138 0.598 0.585 0.585 −0.022 0.969
2004/2003 4932 0.584 0.578 0.578 −0.011 0.811
2005/2004 5039 0.343 0.353 0.353 0.028 0.010 0.080
2006/2005 5494 0.347 0.371 0.371 0.063 0.024 0.001∗∗
2007/2006 5498 0.268 0.289 0.289 0.072 0.021 0.000∗∗
Note: ∗∗ DRWR are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Source: authors’ calculation.
24 It is important to stress that the results may be partly inﬂuenced by the business cycle. During the period
studied, Slovakia recorded strong economic growth (employment growth can be found in Table 5).
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After 5,000 simulations it turns out that real wage changes are affected by real
wage rigidity only in the last two years, fwcp grows from 6% in 2006 to 7% in 2007.
The extent of real rigidity measured as a share of companies affected by real rigidity
(column labeled as rwr in Table 7) is almost comparable to the share of companies
affected by nominal wage rigidity. It should be noted that applying wide deﬁnition
of wage (including bonuses) makes it easier for employer to adjust pays in any of the
years; therefore level of reported rigidities represents its minimum bound.
6.2 Into the attributes
The overall wage rigidity may not correspond to those in different segments of corpo-
rate sector. Next, we therefore measure the degree of rigidity in different subgroups
classiﬁed by company size and sector of economic activity (according to primary
NACE classiﬁcation). Firstly, we split the sample into two subsamples according to
the average annual number of employees in the company. Secondly we aim at rigidi-
ties in manufacturing and services.
We distinguish between small and large companies. Small companies are those,
which have up to 40 employees. On the other hand, large companies have at least
90 employees. Thresholds 40 and 90 employees were set in order to split the sample
into three subsamples with similar number of observations. Table 8 reports the results.
Since we did not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant presence of rigidity we can conclude that
small employers can better adjust wage costs according to their needs. On the other
hand, we found signiﬁcant nominal wage rigidities in larger companies in most of the
years of the period studied (from 2004 up to 2007).
Table 8. Nominal wage rigidity by company size
Years
Small (<40 employees) Large (>90 employees)
fwcpsim nwr P-value fwcpsim nwr P-value
2001/2000 −0.021 0.730 0.115 0.022 0.011∗
2002/2001
2003/2002 −0.055 0.944 0.014 0.003 0.391
2004/2003 0.007 0.002 0.434 0.077 0.021 0.031∗
2005/2004 0.004 0.001 0.467 0.129 0.030 0.003∗∗
2006/2005 0.038 0.010 0.167 0.150 0.029 0.001∗∗
2007/2006 0.037 0.009 0.181 0.152 0.025 0.003∗∗
Note: ∗∗(∗) DNWR are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% (5%) level.
Source: authors’ calculation.
Further, we divided the sample according to economic activity. Here we report
the results only for manufacturing and service (Table 9). It turns out that companies
in the service sector can better adjust wage costs according to their needs, whereas
manufacturing seems to be more rigid in wage formation.
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Table 9. Nominal wage rigidity in manufacturing and services
Years
Manufacturing Services
fwcpsim nwr P-value fwcpsim nwr P-value
2001/2000 −0.013 0.630 0.023 0.007 0.289
2002/2001
2003/2002 0.015 0.003 0.374 −0.040 0.872
2004/2003 0.042 0.012 0.135 −0.002 0.527
2005/2004 0.073 0.017 0.041∗ 0.021 0.007 0.284
2006/2005 0.171 0.035 0.000∗∗ 0.009 0.002 0.419
2007/2006 0.092 0.018 0.023∗ 0.072 0.020 0.027∗
Note: ∗∗(∗) DNWR are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% (5%) level.
Source: authors’ calculation.
7. Conclusions
Having reproduced a histogram location approach on the industrial level, we may con-
clude as follows. It is relevant to use histogram location approach and thus search for
downward nominal wage rigidities in EU-15 and in EU-10 countries separately. Inte-
gration of all observations into one full sample (of EU-15 and EU-10 countries) may
be a source of distortion, which originates in speciﬁc economic background of data in
the two subgroups. Extent of the distortion, however, may be quantiﬁed and therefore
interpretation of a full sample is possible with caution.
Nominal wages are rigid downward especially in Belgium and the Netherlands
(possibly also in Austria and France) where more than 40% of wage changes were pre-
vented. For all the other countries of the EU-15 sample we have not found signiﬁcant
wage rigidities, even though we found over 20% downward wage rigidities in the UK
and Finland. These ﬁndings are generally in line with other results from cross-country
studies. Furthermore it suggests that decreasing time trend of downward nominal wage
rigidities identiﬁed by Holden and Wulfsberg (2007) reached its low point in the 1990s
and it started to grow again.
Nominal wages in the new EU member states are relatively ﬂexible across the
sample. In case of speciﬁc countries, however, ﬁnal results cannot be safely concluded
due to very few negative observations in the sample, which yield higher sensitivity to
random disturbances, hence making such results difﬁcult to interpret.
Inthesecondpartofthepaperweemployhistogramlocationapproach oncompany
level data in Slovakia. The modiﬁcation in this paper is the adoption of the method-
ology proposed by Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) to a company level data. The data
set we used covers hourly wages in the time period between 2000 and 2007. The es-
timated extent of both nominal and real rigidities detected by the methodology used
is relatively small. We can conclude that ﬂexible wages favored the decision of euro
adoption in Slovakia in 2009.
We have identiﬁed and measured nominal wage rigidities only in the second part
of the observed period (2005–2007). Although the methodology allows us to estimate
lower bound of wage rigidity, based on estimated ﬁgures we can conclude that down-
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ward wage rigidity is small in the Slovak Republic. The computed share of companies
affected by nominal wage rigidity ranges from 1.5% in 2005 to 2.2% in 2006. As a
result, companies paid almost 10 million euros (estimated) more due to nominal wage
rigidities in 2007. In macroeconomic sense this makes additional 0.14 percentage point
of wage growth, which is a negligible effect. According to the methodology used, the
extent of real wage rigidity is comparable with the degree of nominal wage rigidity and
ranges between 2.1% and 2.4%.
Detailed analysis shows that small businesses can better adjust wage costs accord-
ing to their needs. On the other hand, we found signiﬁcant nominal wage rigidities in
larger businesses in most of the years in the period studied. We can also conclude that
companies in the service sector can better adjust wage costs according to their needs
whereas manufacturing seems to be more rigid in wage formation.
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